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Abstract:  
This paper attempts to measure the causal impact of the speed of judiciaries on 
economic activity by using two novel instrumental variables measuring judicial 
procedural ambiguity and complexity. First, I find that temporally exogenous 
conflicting judicial decisions taken in India due to the Code of Civil Procedure’s 
ambiguity lead to higher expected trial duration as judges are required to spend 
considerable time in choosing between several conflicting views. Second, I find that 
Indian High Court amendments complicating procedures to treat a case are related to 
higher trial duration. By using spatial and temporal variations in the occurrence of 
conflicting decisions and enactment of amendments as instrumental variables, I am 
able to measure the impact of judicial speed on credit markets, agricultural 
development and manufacturing performance. 
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I Introduction
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the e¤ects of institutions on
economic performance. One key question in this literature is causation, because insti-
tutions are arguably endogenous. The rst issue when relating institutions to economic
performance is one of reverse causality. For example, States with higher per capita
incomes are able to devote more funds to improving institutions and thus have better
institutions. The second issue is one of unobservable omitted variables, which are driving
both judicial and economic outcomes, such as pessimism regarding a particular States
prospects or the backwardnessof another. For these reasons, it is important, but not
easy, to nd exogenous sources of variation in the quality of institutions if one wishes to
relate it to economic performance.
This paper focuses on the judiciary, a topic of rst-order importance in this literature,
and on its speed, an objective measure identied as a key problem in India. In this
paper, I focus on procedural ambiguity and complexity as two potential reasons for
the slowness of Courts in India. I read and classied all conicting judicial decisions
pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure taken by High Courts between 1971 and
1996. Conicting judicial decisions, in other words violations of precedents already
established by High Courts, are found to increase trial duration as judges are required
to spend considerable time in choosing between several conicting views. I also read
and classied the 430 State amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by
High Courts between 1971 and 1996. In particular, I nd that the 94 amendments
complexifying procedures that have to be followed by the Courts (subsequently named
Court red tapeamendments), not explicitly designed to deteriorate speed, signicantly
increase expected duration of trials in High Courts. I then exploit the spatial and
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temporal variation of conicting judicial decisions and Court red tape amendments
to instrument the impact of expected duration of a trial in High Court on economic
activity.
There are four reasons to believe that these two variables (conicting judicial deci-
sions and Court red tapeamendments) could represent good instrumental variables.
First, I use a panel data analysis and include State xed e¤ects to account for perma-
nent di¤erences across States in policies and outcomes. If systematic determinants of
amendments are time invariant characteristics, this will remove endogeneity concerns.
Second, the temporal variation in conicting judicial decisions is exogenous as they arise
after the arbitrary occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Third, Court red tapeamendments were not explicitly designed to
deteriorate the speed of Courts. As such, they were not endogenous to the judicial slow-
ness at the time the amendment was passed. Fourth, I try to account for forces leading
to amendments enactment by looking at the political inuence of parties in determining
High Court amendments and at the political representation of certain groups likely to
inuence amendments.
The speed of the judiciary has been identied as a key problem in India. Data on cases
pending in courts indicate that there were 3.1 million cases pending in 21 High Courts
and 20 million in subordinate courts in 20001. Extreme examples of judicial slowness
refer to cases taking 47 years to be resolved, by which time the plainti¤ had died.
Slow judiciaries could heavily shape economic activity. First, slow judicial enforcement
increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers: anticipating that creditors will not be
able to recover their loans quickly via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default.
Creditors respond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of
credit. Second, the probability of harsh punishment in monetary or non-monetary terms
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heavily dissuades opportunistic agents to default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower
judiciaries make the discounted value of punishment lower, thereby weakening incentives
to cooperate. For example, if a rm wants to undertake an investment in order to
supply another with a particular asset, the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic
behavior by the partner arises once the investment costs are sunk. A speedy judicial
system enforcing contracts swiftly could limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior
and foster investment. For these reasons, it is important to nd an explanation for the
slowness of the courts in India and analyze its impact on economic activity. In this
paper, I nd that slower judiciaries reduce access to credit markets in the agricultural
sector, leading to depressed agricultural outputs. I also nd that slower judiciaries
are associated with lower outputs in sectors dependent on strong judiciaries, such as
registered (as opposed to unregistered) manufacturing and trade.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the causal e¤ects of institutions
on economic performance. There are some successful attempts at resolving the endo-
geneity and causality issues (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001).
To open the black box of institutions, I focus in this paper on the judiciary, in particu-
lar its speed, which has been identied in India as one of its key problem. The literature
often exploits spatial variation in the quality of the judiciary to identify its e¤ect on
economic activity. Knack and Keefer (1995) relate professional country risk measures
provided by business experts to their measure of judicial quality which is the amount of
contract-intensive money (the di¤erence between M2 and cash). However, it might be,
for example, that states that have in general better policies are also more inclined to
have e¢ cient judiciaries. But if that is the case, judicial quality just reects the general
better economic policies and in itself may not be important in driving better economic
outcomes. Jappelli et al (2005) present a model of the e¤ect of judicial enforcement on
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credit markets and then test it using panel data from Italian provinces. The authors
nd, among other things, that the duration of civil trials (measured by actual duration
in the past) as well as the stock of pending civil trials per inhabitant are negatively corre-
lated with loans granted to domestic companies and positively correlated with measures
of credit constraints. Cristini et al (2001) relate di¤erences in judicial e¢ ciency across
Argentinean provinces to the size of provincial credit markets. Castelar Pinheiro et al
(2001) perform a similar analysis in Brazil. In these four papers, no attempt is made to
deal with the potential endogeneity of the judicial ine¢ ciency measures.
Djankov et al (2003) have made an important contribution to the study of courts.
They measured judicial formalism in 109 countries around the world. They found ju-
dicial formalism greater in countries with civil rather than common law systems and
that it is associated with a lack of consistency, honesty and fairness in judicial deci-
sions. Endogeneity concerns were addressed by using legal origin as an instrument for
judicial formalism. Acemoglu et al (2005) use the same data to relate judicial e¢ ciency
to economic outcomes using legal origin as an instrumental variable. They nd that
contracting institutions have no impact on economic performance once property rights
institutions are controlled for. This paper di¤ers from Acemoglu et al (2005) in two ways.
First, it uses a within-country analysis of India. By limiting myself to one country, I
am able to control for a range of factors and inuences that cannot be as convincingly
controlled for in cross country data. This allows me to identify the e¤ect of judicial
e¢ ciency independently from that of laws, legal origins, and other country-wide char-
acteristics. Second, it generates clear policy implications regarding the desirability of
simplifying reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure.
One notable exception in this literature is Visaria (2006) where a di¤erence-in-
di¤erences strategy based on two sources of variation (the monetary threshold for claims
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to be eligible for these tribunals and the staggered introduction of tribunals across In-
dian states) is used to show that the establishment of tribunals reduces delinquency in
loan repayment by between 3 and 11 percent. This paper di¤ers from Visaria (2006)
in two ways. First, I focus on judiciarys speed by showing explicitly the link between
conicting judicial decisions and Court red tapeamendments and decreased judicial
speed. Second, I relate judiciarys speed to credit access but also to other outcomes such
as agricultural credit supply and development, registered and unregistered manufactur-
ing, trade, hotel and restaurants, banking and insurance, real estate sectors development
and ultimately, poverty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes data collected concerning
conicting decisions made by High Courts and amendments to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure between 1971 and 1996. Section III focuses on theoretical issues, explaining both
the reasons behind these amendments and the potential impact of the judiciary on eco-
nomic activity. This section claries the econometric specication used by specifying
what control variables and what economic outcomes should be used. Section IV con-
tains an empirical analysis of the e¤ects of both conicting decisions and amendments
on the expected duration of High Court trials. Section V examines the e¤ects of the
judiciary on economic outcomes. Section VI concludes.
II Data
Judicial institutions are the same across courts and States. The Indian judiciary
operates on three levels: a single Supreme Court at the federal level; High Courts in
each of the States; and, at lower levels, district judges for civil cases and session judges
for criminal cases. Speed has been identied as a key problem. Examples of judicial
slowness are striking:
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the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, took 11 years to
acquit the headmaster of a school on the charge of taking a bribe for signing
the salary arrears bill of his school. In another case of judicial delay, the
victim was former Union Law Minister, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. The judgement
came in his lifetime but it took 47 years for the Maharashtra government to
execute the decree passed in his favour against illegal encroachment of his
land by Pakistani refugees. By then he was dead.2
Legal experts argue that the Code of Civil Procedure is a major reason why Indias
judiciary is so slow (Debroy, 2000). To prove this, I will analyze when and which High
Courts violated their own precedents using the 144th Report on Conicting Judicial
Decisions Pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. These conicting judicial
decisions may increase expected durations of High Court trials. I will also analyze how
State amendments to the Code a¤ect the expected duration of High Court trials.
II.1 Conicting judicial decisions
The Code of Civil Procedure (1908) contains Indias laws relating to procedures in
suits and civil proceedings. They may be summed up as follows: procedures for ling
civil cases, court powers for passing various orders, court fees and stamps involved
in the ling of cases, rights of the parties to cases, namely plainti¤ and defendant,
jurisdictions and parameters within which civil courts must function, specic rules for
case proceedings, right of appeals, reviews and references. Legal experts have long argued
that ambiguity in Indian law increases delays in case treatment. For example, the Indian
Law Commissions 136th report entitled Conicts in High Courts decisions on central
laws how to foreclose and how to resolvestates that those who are entrusted with the
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function of adjudicating on questions of law must spend considerable time in choosing
between two or more possible views on a subject which falls to be considered before
them3. This is also true for the Code of Civil Procedure. This code is so ambiguous
that opposite decisions on similar cases have been reached in di¤erent High Courts. An
even worse problem is when the same High Court arrives at opposite verdicts on similar
cases at di¤erent times. The underlying intuition is that, after a violation of its own
precedent by a High Court, judges have no choice but to spend considerable time on
choosing between two or more possible views on the subject at hand. Studying every
such violation in the period from 1971 to 1996 has allowed me to relate, in the empirical
section, their occurrence in certain States at certain times to the expected duration of
High Court trials in view of seeing whether or not conicting judicial decisions caused
by the Civil Procedure Codes ambiguity may explain the countrys slow judiciary.
The occurrence of conicting judicial decisions could have another e¤ect on the ju-
diciary. As the Law Commission of Indias 136th report states, those whose business
is to advise persons who consult them on questions of law, nd it di¢ cult to give such
advice with condence where the decisions are conicting4. In other words, such High
Court reversals may lead to increased uncertainty in case outcome. This might decrease
litigantswillingness to le cases and thereby increase judicial speed. The net impact of
conicting judicial decisions on the expected duration of a High Court trial is therefore
an empirical question. The empirical section of this paper will relate the occurrence of
the same High Court precedent violations to the expected duration of High Court trials.
I will now describe the data collected.
The Law Commission of India published in 1992 its 144th report on Conicting
Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by K.N. Singh,
Indias Chief Justice from 25.11.1991 to 12.12.1991. This report summarises conicting
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decisions made by High Courts arising from ambiguity and lack of clarity in the Civil
Procedure Code. It presents a total of 30 di¤erent Code rules having led to opposite
decisions by di¤erent High Courts, succinctly describing the Codes ambiguity and listing
each High Courts opposing view. It includes 163 opposing decisions by di¤erent High
Courts involving these 30 rules (see Figure III for a graph of all the decisions taken
by High Court violating (+1) or conrming (-1) prior judgements). In the following
example I will consider an extreme case in which a High Court contradicted itself in two
di¤erent cases based on the same point of law.
Order 23, Rule 1(3) allows for the withdrawal of suits with liberty to le fresh suits
under certain circumstances, namely formal defector su¢ cient grounds. The ques-
tion here is whether or not the rule applies in cases of partial or total suit abatement,
that is, on the death of a party. Ambiguity is caused by another rule which explicitly
mentions the death of a party. Order 22 Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties
Rule 4 states that in the case of the death of a sole defendant, or in the case of the
death of one of several defendants and the right to sue does not survive against the sur-
viving defendant, then the Court, on an application made on behalf of the dead party,
shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and
shall proceed with the suit. However, if no application is made, the suit shall abate as
against the deceased defendant. Rule 9 further states that where a suit abates under this
order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action. Therefore, allowing
the plainti¤ to withdraw in such circumstances and le a fresh suit would allow him to
bypass Order 22. This was the view taken in a 1936 Calcutta Case5. In the latter, a suit
was directed against the sole dependant for possession. On his death, his legal repre-
sentatives were not substituted and, consequently, the suit abated. Withdrawal was not
permitted. However, in a later 1953 Calcutta Case6, a leave to withdraw was granted
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in a case where the suit abated upon the death of one co-trespasser. Nevertheless, the
view taken in 1936 reappeared later in a 1984 case7. It is worth noting that K.N. Singh
(ex-Chief Justice of India and author of the report) recommended clarifying the code in
such a way that the death of a party would not constitute grounds for withdrawal. This
recommendation was never introduced and the ambiguity remains to this day.
I argue that High Court reversals such as these increase the likelihood of longer case
durations. In fact, in cases where the defendant dies, judges are required to carefully
consider not only Order 23, Rule 1(3), Order 22 Death, Marriage and Insolvency of
Parties Rule 4 and Rule 9, but also the following precedents: the 1936 Calcutta Case:
Ramesh v Deo Mehar Bibi, 40 CWN 1019 (RCMitter J.); the 1953 Calcutta Case: Hakir
Mahamed v Abdul Majid, AIR 1953 Cal 588, para 3; and the 1984 Calcutta Case: Shyam
Ray v Harnam De, AIR 1984 Cal 67, 70 para 12. Because Singhs recommendation was
not adopted, coming to a decision is all the more di¢ cult. In this case, I increment by 1,
from 1984 on in West Bengal, a violation of a precedent established by the same High
Court variable. I also subtract it by 1 when a decision taken in a case is conrmed
explicitly by another later case. There have been 31 such occurrences in Indias States
between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure IV for the graph of this variable per state per year).
I expect to see a positive correlation with the expected duration of High Court trials.
The crucial feature of the analysis is the temporally random occurrence of this am-
biguous case. In this particular example, the violation of a precedent established by
the same High Court variable takes the value 1 in 1984 in West Bengal due to the
occurrence of a death of one party in a case in 1984 and the subsequent necessity to use
Orders 22 and 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The temporal variation in the vio-
lation of a precedent established by the same High Courtvariable is not endogenous
to the economic, political or judiciarys conditions, but is rather due to the arbitrary
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occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Spatial variation in this variable is not necessarily random. The fact that judges
contradict precedents previously established by their own High Court is perhaps merely
a reection of their ability. The violation of a precedent established by the same High
Court could simply be a measure of a High Courts quality. An empirical analysis
relating this variable to the expected duration of a trial in High Court could possibly
confuse the Code of Civil Procedures ambiguity with the quality of a particular court.
I therefore control for the quality or level of competence of a particular court in the
empirical analysis.
To measure procedural ambiguity, I have codied the 163 conicting judicial decisions
according to the 144th report on Conicting Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908published in 1992 by the Law Commission of India. I will now
focus on another potential reason why courts are slow in India: procedural complexity.
II.2 Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure
The Code of Civil Procedure (1908) is common across Indian Courts and States. It is
thus impossible to evaluate the impact of its complexity on judicial speed. A temporal
variation in the complexity of the Code of Civil Procedure could be used to look at the
evolution of judicial speed before and after the reform. However, several changes could
happen in the mean time and drive the observed evolution of judicial speed. A spatial
variation in the complexity of the Code of Civil Procedure could be used to look at the
evolution of judicial speed in States where High Courts enacted changes. However, High
Courts which enact changes could maybe be situated in States more prone to reform.
It might be, for example, that states that have in general better policies are also more
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inclined to have e¢ cient judiciaries.
Ideally, one should use spatial and temporal variations in the complexity of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This would allow for a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis: States that
enacted changes to the Code of Civil Procedure would be compared to States that
did not, before and after these changes. The advantage of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach is that it deals with any preexisting systematic di¤erence between States. A
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach would isolate the causal impact of these spatial and
temporal variations in the complexity of the Code of Civil Procedure on judicial speed
conditional on the common time e¤ects assumption: States that enacted changes, had
they not enacted these changes, would have evolved in the same way as States that did
not enact changes.
In this paper, I nd such spatial and temporal variations in the complexity of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This Code has been amended from time to time by various
Acts of Central and State Legislatures. According to Section 1228, High Courts have
power to amend, by rules, procedures laid down by the Orders. These High Court
amendments set precedents for the entire State since India functions according to the
common law system the actions of High Court judges set precedents for the functioning
of subordinate courts in their particular State. The exercise of these powers has brought
430 amendments to the Orders by various High Courts since 1971. I read each of these
amendments and isolated the Court red tapeamendments which add procedures to be
followed by the Court. An example of such amendments concerns Order 39 Temporary
Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders, Rule 4:
Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-
Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside, by
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the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatised with such
order [...].
Compare this with the Madhya Pradesh High Court amendment enacted in 1984:
Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-
Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside, by the
Court for reasons to be recorded, either on its own motion or on application
made thereto by any party dissatised with such order [...].
Reasons for putting aside an injunction must be recorded in Madhya Pradesh after
1984. This may slow down the courts. I therefore classify this amendment as a +1
in the Court red tapevariable from 1984 onward for Madhya Pradesh and expect a
positive correlation with the expected duration of High Court trials. There have been
94 such amendments in India between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure I for a graph of these
Court red tapeamendments by State and year). Such an amendment was designed
to increase the quality of the courts by forcing the judge to record a valid reason in a
written form.
In this paper, I focus solely on Court red tapeamendments. These amendments,
as per the example given, were not designed explicitly to decrease the speed of the judi-
ciary. This is an important element to keep in mind for the econometric analysis. Other
amendments, called explicit speedamendments, were explicitly designed to a¤ect ju-
dicial speed. These amendments are by denition endogenous to the economic, political
but most of all judicial conditions of the time. The overall assessment of amendments
to the Code of Civil Procedure is that there are two types of amendments: supply-side
and demand-side amendments. Table I denes each amendment category and presents
a number of descriptive statistics (Column (2) presents the sum of the amendments
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weighted by their direction, Column (3) presents the ratio of the weighted sum by the
total number of amendments: explicit speed amendments in India generally favour
the shortening of procedures). If one visualizes demand and supply curves for dispute
resolution, supply-side amendments involve a shift of the supply curve. Because of the
shift, the number of cases disposed will go up or down. There are two types of supply-
side amendments found in the Code of Civil Procedure: Court red tapeand explicit
speed amendments. Demand-side amendments, which involve shifting the demand
curve, may also a¤ect judicial speed. Some amendments are likely to a¤ect litigants
willingness to go to court. This in turn a¤ects case backlog and thus overall judicial
speed. I classify these demand-side amendments in nine di¤erent categories according
to sections of the population they are likely to a¤ect. I call them: Defendant red
tape, poor, agricultural, business, government, judgment-debtor, demand-
side solution, plainti¤ red tape and certainty. Table I provides a denition for
each amendment as well as some descriptive statistics. Data Appendix 1 provides ex-
amples of such amendments. Based on these categories, I further dene broad indexes:
Speedamendments include all amendments likely to have an impact on speed, namely
these nine demand-side categories and the two supply-side categories. This allows me
to dene a nal category: implicit speedamendments equal to the di¤erence between
speed and explicit speed amendments. There have been 288 amendments of this
type in India between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure II for a graph of these implicit speed
amendments by State and year). Data Appendix 2 describes Allahabad States complete
amendment history, providing an overall view of the codication.9
This section has isolated two potential determinants of judicial speed: conicting
judicial decisions and Code of Civil Procedure amendments likely to a¤ect expected
durations of trials (Court red tapeamendments). I will now discuss possible endo-
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geneity concerns arising from these two determinants as well as the expected impact of
the judiciary on economic activity.
III Theory
This paper attempts to nd the causes of judicial ine¢ ciency in India. I have identi-
ed 31 conicting judicial decisions and 94 Court red tapeamendments between 1971
and 1996 which could a¤ect the expected duration of a trial in High Court.
The papers second objective is to relate the judiciarys speed to economic perfor-
mance. Cross section analysis relating judicial speed to economic performance is not
appropriate in answering such a question since unobserved State heterogeneity might
inuence the results. I employ a panel data analysis dealing with unobserved time con-
stant State heterogeneity. There might still, however, be unobserved time variant State
heterogeneity. One response to this problem would be to nd exogenous sources of vari-
ation in the quality of the judiciary. This would allow for a causal interpretation of
judicial quality on economic outcomes. This paper seeks to locate sources of variation in
the speed of the judiciary. Immediately after a violation of a precedent established by
the same High Courtor a Court red tapeamendment in a particular State, I expect
the duration of a High Court trial to increase and thus economic performance to be
a¤ected. This is the instrumental variable approach intuition, one in which Court red
tapeamendments and violation of a precedent established by the same High Court
are instrumental variables for the expected duration of High Court trials in a regression
on economic performance.
Two questions remain. First, one instrumental variable approach assumption is that
instruments must be exogenous. I will present in this section the reasons to believe why
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such violations or amendments may be good instrumental variables. Second, I need to
clarify exactly what economic outcomes are likely to be inuenced by the judiciary; just
what are the mechanisms through which the judiciary a¤ects economic activity.
III.1 Quality of the instrumental variables
There are four reasons to believe that these variables could represent good instrumental
variables.
First, this paper uses spatial and temporal variation in amendments a¤orded by the
Indian federal system to estimate the impact of amendments to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure on the judiciarys outcomes. State xed e¤ects account for permanent di¤erences
across States in policies and outcomes. If systematic determinants of amendments are
time invariant characteristics, this will remove endogeneity concerns. A specicity of
this paper is that the rst-stage of the instrumental variable estimation is much like a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator between 1971 and 1996.
Second, as explained in the example given about one conicting judicial decision,
the temporal variation in conicting judicial decisions is exogenous as they arise after
the arbitrary occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Third, in this paper, I focus solely on Court red tapeamendments, which were not
explicitly designed to deteriorate the speed of Courts. As such, they were not endogenous
to the judicial slowness at the time the amendment was passed. Other amendments
such as explicit speedamendments were enacted with the explicit objective to a¤ect
judicial speed. This is obvious in the following example. Consider Order 9 Appearance
of Parties and Consequences of Non-Appearance, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code:
Dismissal of suit where plainti¤, after summons returned un-
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served, fails for one month to apply for fresh summons.-Where, after
a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants,
and returned unserved, the plainti¤ fails, for a period of one month from the
date of the return made to the Court by the o¢ cer certifying to the Court
returns made by the serving o¢ cers, to apply for the issue of a fresh sum-
mons the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as against
such defendant, unless [...]
Compare it with the Bombay High Court amendment enacted in 1987:
Dismissal of suit where plainti¤, after summons returned un-
served, fails for two months to apply for fresh summons.-Where,
after a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defen-
dants, and returned unserved, the plainti¤ fails, for a period of two months
from the date of the return made to the Court by the o¢ cer certifying to
the Court returns made by the serving o¢ cers, to apply for the issue of a
fresh summons the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as
against such defendant, unless [...]
I have italicized the di¤erence between the two amendments. This di¤erence could
potentially a¤ect case backlog. It implies that, in India, a case is dismissed after one
month if the plainti¤ fails to apply for a fresh summons once a defendant summons
returns unserved. However, in the Bombay High Court, and consequently in all Maha-
rashtra courts, cases are dismissed after only two months. This may have slowed down
case dismissal in Maharashtra State after 1987. I therefore classify this amendment as
a -1 in the explicit speed variable forever after 1987 for Maharashtra1011. I do not
consider explicit speedamendments in the analysis as these amendments are obviously
17
endogenous. I only consider Court red tapeamendments, which only include amend-
ments adding procedures to the courts and do not explicitly posit delay reduction as an
objective.
However, even if explicit speed amendments are discounted, one could still ar-
gue that high court Court red tape amendment making is a purposeful action, one
responsive to economic, political or even judicial conditions within the State.
Fourth, as Besley et al [2000] advocate in this case, I try to identify and account for
the forces leading to these amendments. One endogeneity concern is related to political
inuence. It may be that political parties that pursue less market-friendly economic
policy changes are also more likely to allow court red tape to increase. Additionally,
they may have inuence on the High Courts in their State and hence a¤ect the Court
red tapeamendments. Under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, High Courts
have the power to amend, by rules, procedures laid down in the Orders. No political in-
terference in decision making is expected in theory; however, considering the tumultuous
relations between Indias Executive and Judiciary, this assumption seems unreasonable.
Political parties and sensitivities in each State inuence the making of amendments.
It is particularly instructive to examine the history of conicts between Executive and
Judiciary between 1971 and 1996, and in particular the history of judge appointment, in
order to determine the degree of independence enjoyed by decision-making courts. To
do this, I will borrow from Bhagwan D. Duas survey in A Study in Executive-Judicial
Conict: The Indian Case.
In the 1970s, Indias judiciary was free from any political interference. In June 1975,
Allahabads High Court found the Prime Minister guilty of electoral fraud and ordered
her removed from Parliament and banned from running for an additional six years.
Instead of confronting the charges, Mrs. Gandhi declared a State of Emergency and
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launched a massive crackdown on civil liberties and political opposition. Judges then
began to interpret the Constitution in light of the new political climate.
The Janata Interregnum (1977-79) attempted to restore to judges some degree of
self-condence. The government cancelled Mrs. Gandhis mass transfer of High Court
judges in order to emphasize that the Constitution was not in the business of punitive
transfers (i.e. transfers without consultation of Indias Chief Justice) of judges.
However, the return to power of the Congress (I) Party in 1980 revived memories of
the Emergency regime. Mrs. Gandhi has often viewed the courts as centres of political
opposition and in 1981 bluntly called into question the judicial integrity of the Janata-
appointed judges12. Chief Justice Chandrachud complained that:
Since the Executive is controlled by political leaders...it may, it is feared,
transfer a judge to a far-o¤place like Sikkim, the Andaman Islands or Assam,
or refuse to grant him further extension if he does not toe the line13.
Due to internal dissension, the Supreme Court undermined in the same year its
independence in the JudgesTransfer Case, in which the majority of a seven-judge Con-
stitutional Bench o¤ered the government carte blanche to hire Supreme Court judges,
re temporary judges and transfer (except on a mass scale) High Court judges without
the consent of Indias Chief Justice. In other words, Mrs. Gandhi was given a free hand
to manage the judiciary as she liked.
In 1993, the policy of transferring judges without consent was abandoned following
the Second Judgescase. The Supreme Court introduced the concept of the primacy of
the Chief Justice of India in matters of recommending persons for appointment to the
higher judiciary14.
To conclude this short survey, I expect political parties to inuence the passing
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of various amendments. However, political interference was limited to certain periods
and parties. I measure a States political inclination by the proportion of seats won
in Legislative Assemblies by four di¤erent party groupings: the Congress Party (Indian
National Congress, Indian Congress Socialist, Indian National Congress Urs), a hard left
grouping (Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India Marxist), a soft left
grouping (Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party), and Hindu parties (Bhartiya Janata
Party, Bhartiya Jana Sangh). I include these terms in the regressions and also interact
these variables with an all-India dummy at value 1 in cases where political interference is
expected, such as during the Emergency Regime (1975-77) and during the years 1981-93
when the First Judgescase was prevalent (described in Figure V). I include the political
variables interacted with this dummy as control variables in all the regressions in order
to remove bias resulting from omission of these variables.
Another endogeneity concern is that certain groups not divided along party lines
but sharing common interests might succeed in inuencing the judiciary. An intuitive
hypothesis would posit the inuence of scheduled castes and tribes in the Legislative
Assemblies on the judiciary which favoured their particular groupings. The suggestion
that such castes and tribes would strive to improve access to justice for poorer sections of
the society would appear intuitive. I therefore expect Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in Legislative Assembliesto exert pressure on courts in regards to demand-side
amendments favouring judicial access. There is growing evidence suggesting that seat
reservation a¤ects public goods allocation in a way that favours the group beneting
from the reservation. Pande [2003] found that reservations of seats for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in State Legislative Assemblies led to increased transfers towards
these groups. After accounting for the direct impact of the fraction of the population
that comprises a States Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a 1% rise in the frac-
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tion of seats reserved to Scheduled Castes in State Legislature is associated with a 0.6%
increase in job quotas for Scheduled Castes. A 1% rise in the fraction of seats reserved
for Scheduled Tribes in State Legislatures is associated with an increase of 0.8 percent-
age points in the share of total State spending devoted to welfare programs targeted to
Scheduled Tribes. At the Panchayat level, Besley et al. [2004] found that reservation
of leadership positions for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe increases by about 7
percentage points the likelihood that a Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes village
household has access to toilets, electricity connections or private water connections via
government schemes. I have thus included the proportion of seats reserved for Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as the groups population share according to
government census following Pande [2003].
This section shows that the use of panel data, the temporally exogenous conict-
ing judicial decisions and the Court red tapeamendments not explicitly designed to
increase judicial speed are good theoretical reasons to believe that conicting judicial
decisions and Court red tapeamendments might be good instrumental variables. Ad-
ditionally, the composition of executive power and Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes
representation must be accounted for in all regressions because the judiciary is not free,
during certain periods, from political interference a¤ecting the enactment of amend-
ments. The second question of how the Judiciary a¤ects economic activity remains.
III.2 A model for the Judiciary
There is increasing evidence suggesting that court system e¢ ciency is important to
well-functioning economies. Slow judiciaries increase costs of accessing legal systems
and favour those with more extra-legal bargaining power. There are two key areas
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where courts may play a role in India: credit markets (di¢ culties in repaying loans) and
contract enforcement. I expect legal system ine¢ ciency to contribute to poor conditions
for societys most vulnerable as well as for its most intensive users of the judiciary.
For example, I expect the poor (societys most vulnerable), creditors (as opposed to
debtors), registered sectors (as opposed to unregistered sectors using extra legal dispute
resolution mechanisms) and contract-intensive activities (such as trade) to be adversely
a¤ected by ine¢ cient legal systems. I will now describe the mechanisms through which
the judiciary a¤ects credit markets and rmscontracting behavior.
Judicial systems inuence rmsdebt contracts. As Pagano et al [2002] explain:
The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent
borrowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same token,
poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers:
anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and
cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors
respond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability
of credit.
The authors develop a model in which collateral is used as a device to solve credit ra-
tioning. They nd that improved judicial e¢ ciency reduces credit rationing and expands
lending. One should expect ine¢ cient judiciaries to disproportionately a¤ect sections of
society unable to provide collateral. I will test this theoretical implication by examining
the situation of farmers, who typically comprise the poor in India.
The second intuitive consequence of an imperfect judiciary is the modication of
economic agentswillingness to cooperate in previously signed contracts. We know that
judiciaries act as important deterrents to fraud that might be more economically attrac-
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tive in the short run. The probability of harsh punishment in monetary or non-monetary
terms would heavily dissuade opportunistic agents to default ex-post on previous agree-
ments. In particular, I expect trade to be negatively a¤ected by weak judiciaries. John-
son et al [1999] state that rms work to sustain relationships in order to avoid searching
for new trading partners. To do so, they o¤er trade credit. But to o¤er trade credit is
to trust that it will be repaid.
One could also expect the quality of judiciaries to impact on investments undertaken
by the rm. I consider the case where a rm would undertake an investment in order
to supply another with a particular asset. However, as Klein et al (1978) emphasized,
the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior arises. Indeed, to induce the
supplier to undertake an investment, a rm can either write a long-term contract with
favorable terms for the supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. But once the costs of
the investment are sunk, there is an immediate incentive for the rm to renege on the
contract and capture the suppliersrents. Alternatively, if search costs to nd a new
supplier are high, there is an immediate incentive for the supplier to use its monopoly
power to impose higher prices. These frictions could reduce the incentive to invest;
Klein et al (1978) conclude that vertical integration will supersede market systems in
such cases. But another way to limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior is a speedy
judicial system that enforces contracts swiftly. This shows that judiciaries should a¤ect
the economic performance of contract-intensive activities. I will test this implication by
examining the performance of manufacturing. If agriculture, trade and manufacturing
are negatively a¤ected by weak judiciaries, I also expect poverty to increase. I will test
these theoretical implications and present the econometric method used.
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IV Methods and Results
This section will relate both conicting decisions and amendments to the Code of
Civil Procedure to judicial functioning. I expect the violation of a precedent established
by the same High Court(a High Court decision violating an earlier decision by the same
High Court because of ambiguity in the Code of Civil Procedure) to have an e¤ect on the
expected duration of a trial in High Court. I also expect Court red tapeamendments
( which modify procedures to be followed by the courts) to be related to the expected
duration of a trial in High Court. It is noteworthy that this section is in fact the rst
stage of an Instrumental Variable estimation of the impact of the judiciary on economic
activity. In the next section I will relate judicial functioning to economic activity using
these conicting decisions and amendments as Instrumental Variables.
In this section, the outcome of interest is the expected duration of a trial in High
Court (durationit). It is equal to the number of pending cases plus the number of led
cases within the year divided by the number of cases disposed of within the year. This
duration is measured in years. Figure VI shows the graph of this variable in 25 states
between 1971 and 1996. To relate violation of a precedent established by the same High
Court (violationit) and amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure (amendmentsit)
and to the expected duration of a trial in High Court, I perform regressions of the form:
(1) durationit = i + t + violationit + amendmentsit + xit + uit
where i corresponds to a state, t to time. i are state xed e¤ects, t time xed e¤ects.
xit are control variables. These xit will include incrementally the ratio of dismissed
appeals to total appeals from the respective high court. This variable determines the
probability that a High Court decides correctly. The underlying assumption here is that
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the Supreme Court is not biased and it is not subject to errors, and that the majority
of the cases are appealed. This is therefore a measure of the quality of courts and an
important variable to take into account in order to isolate the impact of ambiguity in
the Code of Civil Procedure with violationit and not only the impact of court quality. I
also include political political controls: the proportion of seats won by Congress parties,
hard left parties, soft left parties and Bharatiya Janta parties interacted with a dummy
indicating when Legislative Assemblies are likely to inuence judicial process15. I then
include the proportion of seats reserved to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in State
Legislative Assemblies interacted with a dummy indicating when Legislative Assemblies
are likely to inuence judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes in the population according to censuses, according to the reasoning developed in
the theoretical section above. I include the number of Panchayats per million capita
in the State to account for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as well as the
proportion of total revenue expenditure spent on Organs of State lagged for two years
to account for the budget devoted to judicial functioning. uit is a disturbance term. I
cluster the standard errors by State in order to deal with concerns over serial correlation
[Bertrand et al, 2002]. State xed e¤ects captures time-constant State-specic factors
such as culture and geography. Year e¤ects capture common shocks such as the central
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure that took place in 1976 (and in 1999 and
2002, though the latter two are not included in the observation sample from 1971 to
1996) as well as other centrally implemented policies. The coe¢ cients of interest are 
and .
Table II relates conicting judicial decisions and Court red tapeamendments to
expected durations of High Court trials. In Column (1), the dependent variable is
durationit. The only explanatory variables are violation of a precedent established by
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the same High Courtand Court red tapeamendments. State xed e¤ects and year
xed e¤ects are included. One extra violation of a precedent established by the same
High Court will increase the expected duration of a trial in High Court by 18.8 days.
This coe¢ cient is statistically signicant. It conrms the intuition that judges must
spend more time in choosing between conicting views when the same High Court vio-
lates its own precedents. One extra Court red tapeamendment increases the expected
duration of a trial in High Court by 3.3 days. This coe¢ cient is statistically signicant.
It conrms the intuition that adding or complicating Court procedures increases delays.
However, the violation of a precedent established by the same High Court variable
could very well be correlated with the quality of judges. I therefore include the ratio
of dismissed appeals in Column (2). I also add political controls following the theoreti-
cal section, which highlighted the fact that Court red tapeamendments are perhaps
responsive to political conditions. I measure a States political inclination by the pro-
portion of seats won in Legislative Assemblies by four di¤erent party groupings: the
Congress Party (Indian National Congress, Indian Congress Socialist, Indian National
Congress Urs), a hard left grouping (Communist Party of India, Communist Party of
India Marxist), a soft left grouping (Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party), and Bhartiya
Janata Party. I further interact these variables with an all-India dummy taking a value 1
when I expect some political interference, such as during the Emergency Regime of 1975-
77 and the years 1981-93, when the First Judgescase was taking place (as described in
Figure V)16. The coe¢ cients are very similar in Column (2). Another hypothesis is that
increased representation of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies
a¤ects judicial quality as Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes push for reforms dispro-
portionately favouring their groups of origin. I included in Column (3) the proportion
of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in State Legislative Assemblies
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interacted with a dummy indicating when the former are likely to inuence the judicial
process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the population ac-
cording censuses following Pandes [2003] methodology. The coe¢ cients are again very
similar. In Column (4), I also include the number of Panchayats per million capita
in the State to account for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In fact, it is
often claimed that judicial systems have only limited impact on economies because peo-
ple resort to alternative dispute resolution institutions, particularly to informal ones.
Koehling [2002] describes one such informal Indian institution: the Panchayats. They
play a crucial role in settling and avoiding rural disputes. Panchayats, with their limited
judicial authority, are used to settle disputes about land usage, tenure and commons. As
locally-bound institutions, they are highly e¢ cient since they are familiar with village
situations and litigants. As a result, their level of acceptance among the population is
high. In cases of dispute resolutions, Panchayats can impose very limited sanctions, but
the social pressure created by judgements serves as strong incentives to comply with
judgements. I also include in Column (4) the proportion of total revenue expenditure
spent on the Organs of State17 lagged two years in order to account for budgets devoted
to judicial functioning. The coe¢ cients remain similar. Other types of amendments
could potentially a¤ect the expected duration of a trial in High Court. In Column (5),
I include speedamendments. The latter is a cumulative variable increased by 1 after
any amendment likely to have an impact on the speed of the courts is passed. This
variable includes explicit speed, court red tape, defendant red tape, judgement-debtor,
demand-side solution, plainti¤ red tape, and certainty amendments. There is no e¤ect
of this variable on the expected duration of a trial in High Court. In Column (6), I
include implicit speed amendments. This variable is the di¤erence between speed
amendments and explicit speed amendments. I subtract explicit speedamendments
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because these amendments are clearly responsive to judicial conditions and are therefore
endogenous to the expected duration of a case in trial. I do not argue that Court red
tapeamendments are any less endogenous, but at least they are not explicitly designed
to reduce delays. Column (6) shows no signicant impact of implicit speedamend-
ments. I also included separately or together every di¤erent type of amendment and
consistently found that only Court red tapeamendments and violation of a prece-
dent established by the same High Courtwere signicant18. Column (4) is the preferred
specication because it includes only signicant amendments a¤ecting duration and the
most complete set of controls. It is interesting to note that the F-value of the F-test
of the joint signicance of Court red tapeamendments and violation of a precedent
established by the same High Courtis 8.06 signicant at 5 percent. This means that
Court red tape amendments and violation of a precedent established by the same
High Courta¤ect signicantly the expected duration of a trial in High Court.
To conclude this section, I found in the panel data analysis that violation of a
precedent established by the same High Courtand Court red tapeamendments were
signicant determinants of the expected duration of High Court trials. This conrms
the intuition presented in the theoretical section. Having found two sources of variation
in judicial speed, I am now able to relate it to economic performance, particularly to the
functioning of credit markets, registered manufacturing and trade sector performance.
V The impact of the judiciary on economic
outcomes
This section relates the expected duration of High Court trials to economic activity.
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I use the following regressions:
(2) eit = i + t + durationit + xit + it
where i corresponds to a State and t to time. eit is an economic outcome of in-
terest. I will rst test Proposition 1, applied to the agricultural sector where issues of
credit availability are more stringent, by using measures of agricultural credit supply
and development. I will then test Proposition 2 by using measures of the development
of registered manufacturing, unregistered manufacturing, trade, hotel and restaurants,
banking and insurance, real estate sectors development and ultimately, poverty. i are
State xed e¤ects and t are time xed e¤ects. xit are control variables. I use the exact
same control variables used in Table II. it is a disturbance term. Standard errors are
clustered by State to take into account concerns over serial correlation [Bertrand et al,
2002]. State xed e¤ects capture State-specic factors such as culture and geography.
Year e¤ects capture common shocks such as central amendments to the Code of Civil
Procedure as well as other centrally implemented policies. The coe¢ cient of interest is
.
There can clearly be some endogeneity between the e¢ ciency of a particular insti-
tution and the economic performance of a particular State. The rst issue is one of
reverse causality: States with higher per capita incomes are able to devote more funds
to improving institutions and thus have better institutions. The second issue is one of
unobservable omitted variables, which are behind both judicial and economic outcomes,
such as pessimism regarding a particular States prospects or the backwardness of
another. This is why two instrumental variables are employed for the expected duration
of High Court trials: violation of a precedent established by the same High Courtand
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Court red tapeamendments.
As highlighted in section III.1, there are four reasons to believe these variables could
be good instrumental variables (the use of panel data, the temporally exogenous con-
icting judicial decisions, the Court red tapeamendments not explicitly designed to
increase judicial speed, the control for forces that could lead to amendment enactment).
The previous section also demonstrated that violation of a precedent established by the
same High Courtand Court red tapeamendments were signicantly related to the
expected duration of High Court trials. In Table II, Column (4), the F-test of the joint
signicance of the two instruments is 8.06.
In addition to this evidence, I present statistical tests of the quality of the in-
struments. I will present over identication as well as Hausmans tests. The over-
identication test is a test of joint signicance of both instruments in a regression of the
tted residuals from the second-stage on these instruments (and all exogenous variables).
This test e¤ectively measures the correlation between instrumental variables and the er-
ror term, which should be insignicantly di¤erent from zero for appropriate instrumental
variables. The Hausman [1978] test is a test of the endogeneity of the judicial measure
and of the quality of the instruments. It tests the equality of the coe¢ cients between
OLS (e¢ cient and consistent under H0 only) and IV (always consistent). There should
be a systematic di¤erence between OLS and IV results in the case of an endogenous
measure of judicial speed and appropriateness of the instruments.
Table III examines the relationship between High Court trial duration and credit sup-
ply to agricultural sectors. For reasons highlighted in the theoretical section, I expect
credit availability to be reduced in regions with slower judiciaries. I expect this problem
to be more stringent for borrowers with less collateral, typically farmers. Column (1)
shows an OLS regression of real per capita agricultural bank nance on the expected
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duration of a High Court trial. The result is insignicant. Column (2) presents a reduced
form version of the impact of violation of a precedent established by the same High
Courtand Court red tapeamendments on real per capita agricultural bank nance.
This conrms the fact that these two variables have an impact on real per capita agri-
cultural bank nance. One extra violation of a precedent established by the same High
Courtdecreases real per capita agricultural bank nance by 6 percent, while one extra
Court red tapeamendment decreases it by 0.6 percent. This is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that violation of a precedent established by the same High Courtand Court
red tapeamendments increase the expected duration of High Court trials, which, in
turn, discourages creditors from o¤ering credit, since they know it will be harder to
recover defaulted loans. It is possible to present some instrumental variable evidence.
Column (3) instruments the expected duration of a trial in High Court with violation
of a precedent established by the same High Courtand Court red tapeamendments.
The coe¢ cient of duration is now negative and signicantly di¤erent from 0. For ex-
ample, an extra 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in High Court19 decreases
real per capita agricultural bank nance by 6 percent. The fact that the instrumented
coe¢ cient is now statistically di¤erent from 0 as opposed to the OLS case may arise
from the presence of unobserved State heterogeneity. Suppose that in a particular State
citizens are especially fastidious, displaying meticulous attention to detail. They will
thus be more litigious and le more cases since they are excessively sensitive to even the
slightest deviation in the terms of a contract. This will increase the expected duration of
a trial in High Court. On the other hand, economic performance will increase thanks to
the citizenrys careful attention to detail. This unobserved variable, if omitted, will bias
upward the coe¢ cient between duration and economic performance. If the instrumental
variables are appropriate, then this bias should be removed. This may be why I nd
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a signicantly negative coe¢ cient in Column (3) as opposed to Column (1). The over-
identication test in Column (3) shows that the correlation between the instruments
and the error term is not signicantly di¤erent from 0. The instrumental variables pass
the over-identication test. This conrms the fact that these two instruments are ap-
propriate. The 2 of the Hausman [1978] test is signicantly di¤erent from 0. This
means that there is a systematic di¤erence between OLS and IV. It is appropriate to
instrument duration with violation of a precedent established by the same High Court
and Court red tapeamendments. This rst result is conrmed in Columns (4) and
(5). An increase of 18.8 days in the expected duration of a High Court trial decreases
the account number of commercial bank advances to agriculture per capita by 3.3 per-
cent and real per capita regional rural bank credit by 6.4 percent. This reduced credit
availability impedes agricultural development. An increase of 18.8 days in the expected
duration of a trial in High Court decreases by 1.7 percentage points the ratio of irrigated
agricultural land. As a result, agricultural performance is impeded by a weak judiciary.
An increase of 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in High Court decreases per
capita State agricultural domestic product by 0.6 percent. The over identication tests
are always conclusive.
Table IV examines the relationship between the expected duration of a trial in High
Court and the economic performance of various sectors. In each case I instrument the
expected duration by violation of a precedent established by the same High Court
and Court red tapeamendments. Column (1) shows that an increase of 18.8 days in
the expected duration of a trial in High Court decreases a States per capita manufac-
turing domestic product by 6 percent. This conrms the fact that this sector should
be a¤ected by weak judiciaries, since one of the characteristics of this sector in India is
the prevalence of relationship-specic investment, heavily dependent on strong judicia-
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ries. Column (2) shows that the registered manufacturing sector is even more a¤ected.
Column (3) shows that an increase of 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in
High Court decreases per capita State trade, hotel and restaurant domestic product by
4 percent. This conrms the intuition that a sector relying heavily on trade credit to
sustain relationships must trust that it will be repaid to perform well. As manufacturing
and trade are negatively a¤ected by weak judiciaries, I also expect people employed in
these sectors to be a¤ected. I use the urban head count index (in percentage) as the
dependent variable in Column (4) to measure the impact of the judiciary on poverty.
The latter shows that an increase of 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in High
Court increases the urban head count index by 1.9 percentage points. Overidentication
tests are consistently conclusive.
These results seem to indicate that the judiciary plays a considerable role in the
economic outcomes of Indias States. I found that farmers have less access to credit
markets. As a result, agricultural development is impeded. I also found that contract-
intensive sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing and trade, are adversely a¤ected
by weak judiciaries. The judiciary impacts the weaker sections of the country, such as
the poor and farmers.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, I have found two sources of variation of judicial speed that are used
to evaluate its impact on economic activity. First, the ambiguity of the Code of Civil
Procedure, measured by the violation of precedents established by the same High Court,
a¤ects expected durations of High Court trials. This is because judges must spend time
choosing between conicting views after such events. Second, amendments to the Code
of Civil Procedure that add or complicate procedures to be followed by the Court a¤ect
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expected durations of High Court trials.
I then relate expected durations of High Court trials to economic outcomes using . I
used these two variables, violation of a precedent established by the same High Court
and Court red tapeamendments, as instrumental variables for the expected duration
of a case in trial. There are four reasons to believe that these two variables could rep-
resent good instrumental variables. First, I use a panel data analysis and include State
xed e¤ects to account for permanent di¤erences across States in policies and outcomes.
If systematic determinants of amendments are time invariant characteristics, this will
remove endogeneity concerns. Second, the temporal variation in conicting judicial de-
cisions is exogenous as they arise after the arbitrary occurrence of cases pertaining to
ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. Third, Court red tape amend-
ments were not explicitly designed to deteriorate the speed of Courts. As such, they
were not endogenous to the judicial slowness at the time the amendment was passed.
Fourth, I try to account for forces leading to amendments enactment by looking at the
political inuence of parties in determining High Court amendments and at the political
representation of certain groups likely to inuence amendments.
Additionally, I presented statistical tests concerning the validity of these instruments.
First, in a rst-stage regression, these two instruments are signicantly related to trial
duration. Second, these two instruments are not related to the error term of the second-
stage regression and thus pass the over-identication test of the endogeneity of the
instrumental variables. Third, the instrumental variable estimation passes the Hausman
Test.
In this paper, I found that the judiciary heavily shapes the economic outcomes of In-
dias States and that farmers have less access to credit markets. As a result, agricultural
development is impeded. I also found that contract-intensive sectors of the economy,
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such as registered manufacturing and trade, are adversely a¤ected by weak judiciaries.
Judiciaries impact weaker sections of the country, such as the poor and farmers.
The policy implications of this paper are clear. The Code of Civil Procedures am-
biguity must be reduced by simplifying and clarifying confusing and redundant rules.
For example, the recommendations of Indias Ex-Chief Justice K.N. Singh in the 144th
Law Commission Report entitled Conicting Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908could be followed. They have yet to be incorporated into the
Civil Procedure Code. Clarifying each ambiguous rule will allow judges to save time
by liberating them from having to deliberate over so many conicting views. Alterna-
tively, to reduce expected durations of High Court trials, the number and complexity of
procedures to be followed by the Courts must be reduced.
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Notes
1Laws Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary
standing committee on Home a¤airs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/
book2/reports/home_a¤/85threport%20.htm
2Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003
3p. 1, Conicts in High Courts decisions on central laws-how to foreclose and how
to resolve, Law Commission of Indias 136th report.
http://lawcommissionondia.nic.in/101-169/Report136.pdf
4p. 1, Conicts in High Courts decisions on central laws-how to foreclose and how
to resolve, Law Commission of Indias 136th report.
http://lawcommissionondia.nic.in/101-169/Report136.pdf
5Ramesh v Deo Mehar Bibi, 40 CWN 1019 (RC Mitter J.)
6Hakir Mahamed v Abdul Majid, AIR 1953 Cal 588, para 3
7Shyam Ray v Harnam De, AIR 1984 Cal 67, 70 para 12.
8The Code is divided into two parts, namely Sections and Orders. While the main
principles are contained in the former, the detailed procedures with regard to matters
dealt with by the Sections are spelled out in the latter.
9Only implicitand explicit speed, court red tape, and defendant red tapeare
included. Speed courtis equal to explicit speedif the court itself is in a position to
set time limits. Other types of amendments included in speedand implicit speedare
not presented.
10It is interesting to note that this one month period was originally a three months
period before a pan-India amendment in 1976. It was later changed in 1999 in another
pan-India amendment to just 7 days! The 1999 amendment had the explicit objective of
facilitating the swift disposal of civil suits and proceedings. The fact that this duration
was modied in 1999 seems to indicate that this order is of particular importance in
determining judicial speed.
11There have been 50 such amendments in India between 1971 and 1996. It is also
worth noting that the time limit imposed in this particular example cannot be modied
or extended by courts. I noted explicit speedamendments where provisions state that
a court may extend a time limit if it wishes to do so. This is important because it is
often said that any amendment is ine¢ cient if it goes against the habits of the court
and if the latter retains the possibility of modifying time limits on a case by case basis.
There are 42 explicit speed amendments where discretion regarding time limits is left
38
to the courts. It is important to keep this in mind when evaluating the impact of these
amendments.
12India Today, January 31, 1982, p.62
13Statesman weekly, May 2, 1981.
14Frontline, A awed mechanism, ZV.Venkatesan, 06/06/2003.
15I also tried with the level terms not interacted with the dummy.
16I also included level terms, not interacted with the dummy, and the results were
again similar.
17This measure is not perfect as it encompasses the State budget for Executive and
Legislative branches.
18results not presented for clarity.
19This was the increase implied by an extra violation of a precedent established by
the same High Court
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